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Abstract
This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and
emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-
sector (cleanand dirty) model with Cournot competition among rms who
face a xed cost of production. The clean sector is dened as the sector with the
highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications
of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative
intensity standards. It is shown that a rms long run equilibrium output in
the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but
only depends on the xed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity
standards can result in clean rms selling allowances to dirty rms, or dirty
rms selling to clean rms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is
demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme
in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards
the size of the clean sector is too large.
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1 Introduction
Governmental authorities increasingly embark upon emissions trading schemes to ef-
ciently curtail environmental pollution. This paper analyzes and compares the two
main market congurations for organizing trade in emission allowances: cap-and-trade
versus intensity standards. Although tradable pollution markets have been studied
extensively in recent years, a comparison of these pollution market designs in an im-
perfectly competitive, multi-sector model is still lacking. The aim of this paper is
to ll this gap by focusing on the connection between emissions trading and market
structure. Since polluting industries are often concentrated in nature, we allow rms
to strategically interact in an imperfectly competitive output market and assess the
sectoral implications of emissions trading in the long run equilibrium. Analyzing the
interaction between emissions trading and output market e¤ects is an important di-
mension in policy assessments, since it is often not optimal to completely eliminate
the pollution-intensive sector, even though reducing pollution is the underlying policy
goal.
Cap-and-trade and intensity-based emissions trading represent schemes that are
based on an absolute cap on emissions and on relative emission intensities, respectively.
Whereas under cap-and-trade a control authority xes the total supply of emissions,
in the case of intensity-based trading a source-specic level of emissions abatement
is set, implying a xed average emissions intensity (e.g., Tietenberg 1999). Prime
examples of cap-and-trade schemes in the U.S. are the acid rain programme and the
RECLAIM programme to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from
stationary sources in the Los Angeles basin. The European counterpart of large scale
cap-and-trade currently occurs within the European Union Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS) for carbon dioxide emissions (e.g., Ellerman and Buchner 2007). In the
1980s the U.S. established intensity-based trading arrangements between reneries as
part of the lead phasedown (e.g., Hahn and Hester 1989; Kerr and Newell 2003).
Another more recent intensity-based scheme is Californias Low Carbon Fuel Standard
(Holland et al. 2009). In Canada an intensity-based trading system was launched in
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1996 under the Pilot Emission Reduction Target. This type of scheme is currently
also one of the main design features of Canadas climate policy (Environment Canada
2007). Also for developing countries intensity targets have been suggested (Philibert
and Pershing 2000), which has entered the post-Kyoto emissions trading design debate
(e.g., Michaelowa et al. 2005; Jotzo and Pezzey 2007).
Our paper illustrates that entry and exit in the output market is a prime factor in
the interplay between sectoral choice, production and emissions trading. We show that
a rms equilibrium level of output in the long run does not depend on the specic
design of the pollution market. Under either a no-policy regime, cap-and-trade or
intensity standards, equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector only depends on
the xed cost of producing in that sector. Due to the existence of xed cost, in
our model we illustrate that in the long run equilibrium a rms price-cost margin
is therefore positive, even with free entry and exit. For a given level of aggregate
emissions in the long run, and given the zero-prot output level per rm, we nd that
a cap-and-trade scheme generates higher welfare than emissions trading via intensity
standards. Relative to the rst-best outcome, the size of the clean (dirty) sector is too
large (small) under the trading regime based on intensity standards.
These results complement and extend the nding by Helfand (1991), Fischer (2001)
and Holland et al. (2009) that intensity standards are generally ine¢ cient, and the
more recent studies by Boom and Dijkstra (2009) and Holland (2012) showing that in
the absence of market power intensity standards cannot attain the rst-best outcome
whereas an absolute emissions trading scheme can.1 Boom and Dijkstra (2009) nd
that the welfare comparison between the two schemes under imperfect competition is
ambiguous in both the short run and the long run. By contrast, we nd in our specic
setting that cap-and-trade yields higher welfare in the long run.
Our welfare result may seem surprising in light of the literature. Boom and Dijkstra
(2009) and Holland (2012) show that cap-and-trade maximizes welfare under perfect
competition (in the short run and the long run), and emission trading based on an
intensity standard does not. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) nd that the welfare comparison
1Note that Holland (2012) does not consider an absolute emissions trading scheme explicitly as we
do but makes use of an emission tax instead, which is equivalent to an absolute cap on emissions.
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is ambiguous under imperfect competition. On the one hand, if competition is close to
perfect, one would expect the perfect-competition result of higher welfare under cap-
and-trade. On the other hand, output is higher under emissions trading via intensity
standards, which counteracts the output-reducing tendency of imperfect competition.
The di¤erence in results stems from our assumption that the emission-to-output ratio
in each sector is xed. In Boom and Dijkstra (2009) this ratio is variable, so that
with intensity standards the industry can expand its output while still implementing
the pollution target by reducing its emission intensity. In the present paper, emissions
trading on the basis of intensity standards leads to an output expansion in the clean
sector and a (drastic) output reduction in the dirty sector. This is contrary to the
optimal policy prescription, which is for both sectors to contract according to their
relative emission intensities. The latter is exactly what cap-and-trade achieves.
Allowing for the presence of market power in the output sector, our study also
adds to the literature that examines the interdependence between market structure
and environmental policy. Seminal contributions in this domain are Buchanan (1969)
and Barnett (1980), which show that the optimal emission tax for a monopoly falls
short of the marginal damage from pollution.2 Other studies that compare emissions
trading on the basis of absolute and relative targets have ignored the multi-sectoral
implications under imperfect competition. Dewees (2001) makes a welfare comparison
between the two emissions trading schemes in a single perfectly competitive industry,
whereas Boom and Dijkstra (2009) make the comparison for a perfectly as well as an
imperfectly competitive sector. Fischer (2003) analyzes emissions trading between two
perfectly competitive sectors, one of them regulated by a cap-and-trade scheme and the
other by a scheme based on intensity standards. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) analyze the
same scenario for two perfectly competitive and two imperfectly competitive sectors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we introduce the benchmark
model. Section 3 develops and analyzes the emissions trading regimes, followed by a
welfare comparison in Section 4. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
2See Millimet et al. (2009) for a survey on the interaction between environmental policy and market
structure.
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2 Basic model
Consider an imperfectly competitive market consisting of n  2 rms that choose
output to maximize prot. Firms can choose to produce output in either one of two
sectors i = c; d, with i = c referring to the clean sector and i = d to the dirty sector.
We shall dene cleanand dirtyat the end of this Section. For simplicity, we treat
the number of rms in each sector, ni; as a continuous variable.3
Firm-level emissions ei > 0 are assumed to vary proportionally with rm-level
output qi > 0 for both goods:
ei = iqi i = c; d (1)
with i > 0: Aggregate output produced by rms in the clean and dirty sector is simply
Qi = niqi; with the two sectors facing the following inverse demand functions:
pi = i  Qi; i = c; d (2)
where pi is the price of good i.4 A higher i (relative to  i) implies an absolute
advantage in demand (at equal output levels) enjoyed by the rm in sector i. Put
di¤erently, i  i reects a price premium for sector i. Production in sector i incurs
xed cost Fi > 0 and constant marginal cost ci > 0. Following Dixit (1979), the
cost margin for a rm in sector i is i   ci > 0; and a rm in sector i has a margin
advantage if i   ci >  i   c i: Further, let us dene a rms full marginal cost, ki;
as its marginal cost of production, ci; plus its cost of emissions from the extra output.
Without environmental policy, ki = ci: We shall see that with emissions trading based
on an absolute cap and a relative intensity standard, ki is given by (16) and (25)
respectively. Both with and without environmental policy, ki is a constant to the
individual rm.
We can now solve for the prot (i)-maximizing output level of a rm with full
marginal cost ki and xed cost Fi. From (2):
max
qi
i = (i   bQi   qi   ki)qi   Fi i = c; d (3)
3This is a standard assumption in the literature; Boom and Dijkstra (2009) is an exception.
4Note that the slope of both inverse demand functions is normalized to  1. In appendix A.1 it is
demonstrated that this normalization procedure has no impact on the subsequent analysis.
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with bQi the aggregate output of all other rms in sector i: The rst-order condition is:
i   bQi   2qi   ki = 0 (4)
By symmetry, bQi = (ni   1)qi so that the equilibrium quantities are:
qi =
i   ki
ni + 1
i = c; d (5)
Substituting (5) and bQi = (ni   1)qi back into (3), prots can be written as:
i =

i   ki   ni(i   ki)
ni + 1

qi   Fi = q2i   Fi i = c; d: (6)
In the long run rms exit from a sector when they incur losses, whereas prots attract
new rms, until prot is driven to zero. Setting i = 0 in (6), we nd:
Proposition 1 Absent environmental policy, or with emissions trading either in the
form of an absolute cap or on the basis of relative intensity standards, the long run
equilibrium output per rm in sector i is:
qi = fi 
p
Fi i = c; d: (7)
Let us now complete the solution for the unconstrained benchmark, i.e., the long
run equilibrium without environmental policy. Substituting ki = ci and (7) into (5)
yields:5
ni =
i   ci   fi
fi
i = c; d (8)
An interior equilibrium exists (e.g., ni > 0) if and only if:
i  i   ci   fi > 0 i = c; d (9)
where i can be seen as the long run cost margin on production. In the long run, each
unit of output should not only cover its marginal production cost, but also contribute
its share fi to cover the xed cost, Fi: Equations (7) to (9) then imply:
niqi = nifi = i i = c; d: (10)
5Overbars represent the value of a variable in the unconstrained benchmark.
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The total amount of emissions generated by the rms in the clean and dirty sector in
the unconstrained benchmark is:
E = cncqc + dncqc = cc + dd: (11)
where the second equality follows from (10).
We shall dene the clean sector as the sector with the greater long run cost margin
on emissions i=i:
6
c
c
>
d
d
; (12)
with i given by (9) and i by (1). This denition implies that when total emissions
are below the unconstrained level (11) and the number of clean and dirty rms is
equal, clean production contributes more to welfare than dirty production. Hence, it
is optimal to have more clean rms than dirty rms.7
3 Emissions trading
This section applies the model developed in the previous section to emissions trading
on the basis of an absolute cap on emissions in the form of a cap-and-trade scheme
(section 3.1) and emissions trading on the basis of a relative intensity standard (section
3.2). We denote these two emissions trading schemes by A and R, respectively.
We shall analyze and compare the trading schemes for a given level L of total
emissions:
L = cncqc + dndqd = cncfc + dndfd: (13)
The second equality follows from Proposition 1. Throughout the analysis we assume
that total emissions L exceed a threshold Lmin:
L > Lmin  cc = E   dd; (14)
where the second equality follows from (11). Condition (14) is necessary and su¢ cient
for interior equilibria (with nc; nd > 0) to exist with emissions trading under the two
design congurations.
6Since i is measured in money per unit of output i and i is measured in emissions per unit of
output i; the long run cost margin on emissions, i=i; is measured in money per unit of emissions.
7This follows formally from equation (A5) given in Appendix A.3.
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In order to ensure that pi > 0 (i = c; d) we shall assume:
c   c +
p
2c + 
2
d
2
> 0: (15)
Note that while we consider imperfect competition in the output market, it is assumed
that rms act as price takers in the tradeable pollution market. Although this may
seem restrictive, it is a credible assumption and not in conict with the imperfectly
competitive nature of the output market. For instance, the EU ETS for carbon emis-
sions allows trade between rms from di¤erent industries such as electric power plants,
glass manufacturers, steel producers, the cement industry as well as rms from the
paper industry. The pollution market can therefore be competitive while competition
in the respective output markets is imperfect.
3.1 Cap-and-trade
The regulator auctions allowances, each valid for one unit of emissions. The allowances
in total sum up to the absolute cap, L, and the allowance price, v; is established on
the pollution market. The prot-maximization problem of rm i; taking the allowance
price as given, can then be written as (3) with:
kAi = ci + vi: (16)
Equation (16) shows that the full marginal production costs under cap-and-trade, kAi ;
equal marginal production costs, ci; plus the cost of buying the allowances for the i
emissions from the extra output. We see that a cap-and-trade policy increases the
marginal cost of both the dirty and the clean rm.
The cap is non-binding if it is greater or equal to the unconstrained level of emissions
given by equation (11), i.e., if L  E: A non-binding cap on pollution will result in
an allowance price v = 0; a cap L < E is binding, implying that the allowance price
v > 0: This ensures that the demand for allowances is equal to its supply shown in
(13). Using (5), (7), (13) and (16), we can now solve for nAc ; n
A
d and v for a given level
of total emissions L. The long run equilibrium allowance price under a cap-and-trade
regime is:
v =
E   L
2c + 
2
d
; (17)
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where E is the unconstrained emission level given by (11).
The long run equilibrium number of rms is:
nAi =
 i( ii   i i) + iL
fi (2c + 
2
d)
i = c; d: (18)
Since nAi is increasing in L < E; we have:
nAi < ni i = c; d: (19)
By (12), nAc in (18) is always positive. However, n
A
d > 0 if and only if:
L > LAmin 
c (dc   cd)
d
= E   d (
2
c + 
2
d)
d
: (20)
The second equality follows from (11). Comparing LAmin in (20) to threshold Lmin in
(14), one directly obtains Lmin LAmin = d
2
c
d
> 0: Condition (14) is therefore a su¢ cient
condition for (20) to hold, meaning that the cap is su¢ ciently lax such that both the
clean and dirty sector coexist.
Let us illustrate our ndings with a specic numerical example where:
c = 1; d = 2; c = d =  = 300; cc = cd = c = 92; fc = fd = f = 8; (21)
so that c = d =  = 200 by (9) and qc = qd = f = 8 by (7). To simplify the graphical
exposition, we assume that the two sectors are identical except for their emissions-to-
output ratios. Figure 1 shows the inverse demand curve for sector i = c; d as pi(Qi)
and the long run average production costs as c + f: The unconstrained benchmark is
at point B with Qi = 200; pi = 100; ni = 25 and E = 600:
Figure 1 illustrates the long run cap-and-trade equilibrium for our numerical exam-
ple (21).8 We take as our starting point a certain value of Qd as the equilibrium value
of total dirty good production for a certain exogenous emission cap L (with the value
of L yet to be inferred). We wish to know what would be the equilibrium value of Qc
that goes with this value of Qd: Once we have established the equilibrium combination
of Qd and Qc; we can infer the associated exogenous level of L from (13) and (21):
L = cQc + dQd = Qc + 2Qd (22)
8In Figures 1 and 2, parameters and variables are shown in italics, while points (ordered pairs) are
shown in roman type.
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Returning to the question of what is the equilibrium value of Qc for a given equi-
librium value of Qd; this follows from (18) and (21) with Qi = nifi; i = c; d:
Qc =
1
d
(Qdc + cd   dc) =
Qd
2
+ 100 (23)
When Qd = 120; for instance; Qc = 160: In order to illustrate this relation between the
equilibrium values of Qc and Qd in Figure 1, it is useful to dene pAc (Qd) as the long run
equilibrium price of the clean good, given that Qd is the long run equilibrium quantity
of the dirty good with emission trading based on cap-and-trade where the exogenous
level of total emissions is given by (22). From (2), (21) and (23), the expression for
pAc (Qd) in general and for our numerical example is, respectively:
pAc (Qd) = c  
1
d
(Qdc + cd   dc) = 200 
Qd
2
: (24)
Figure 1 shows the pAc (Qd) curve for our numerical example. We see that when
Qd = 120; then pc = 140 so that Qc = 160: Applying (22), we see that the combination
Qd = 120; Qc = 160 is the equilibrium outcome for the exogenous emission cap of
L = 400: The complete characterization of the cap-and-trade equilibrium is then:
When L = 400; then Qd = 120; pd = 180; nd = 15; Qc = 160; pc = 140; nc = 20; and
by (17) v = 40: For any given Qd; the pAc (Qd) curve given by (24) is halfway between
pi(Qi) and c + f: This is because by (3) with  = 0 and (16), the vertical distance
between pd and c+f equals vd; while the vertical distance between pc and c+f equals
vc: The ratio between the two distances is thus d=c; which equals 2 in our numerical
example (21).
3.2 Intensity standards
In contrast to a cap-and-trade system, consider now the case where the government
sets a pollution intensity standard i for sector i = c; d: Under such an intensity-based
trading system, if a rm wants to emit more per unit than the standard allows, it
can buy allowances from rms that emit less per unit than the standard allows. The
result is that, on average, the economy as a whole complies with the emission standard
but the individual rm has the exibility to deviate from it. With our specication
10
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Figure 1: Long run equilibrium with cap-and-trade and welfare optimum
of the demand function as shown in (2) we have implicitly dened one unit of good i
such that when the price pi increases by one unit, demand Qi decreases by one unit.
However, there is no reason why the regulator should adopt this denition of a unit
and set i = : We therefore allow c to di¤er from d.9
The prot-maximization problem of rm i; taking the allowance price under inten-
sity standards, w; as given, can then be written as (3) with:
kRi = ci + w(i   i): (25)
The full marginal production costs under intensity standards, kRi ; are equal to marginal
production costs, ci; plus the cost of buying the allowances for the extra emissions
exceeding the standard. Each extra unit of output comes with i extra emissions as
well as with permission for i extra emissions. If i > i, rm i has to buy allowances
from other rms; if i < i; the rm can sell allowances.
9Note that the denition of a unit of production does not a¤ect our denition of the clean and
dirty sector as given by (12), because the latter denition is in terms of the long run cost margin on
emissions (see also footnote 6).
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Substituting (25) and (7) into (5), we nd:
fi =
i   ci + w(i   i)
ni + 1
i = c; d: (26)
Using (7), the pollution market clears via the constraint:
nRd fd(d   d) = nRc fc(c   c): (27)
This constraint reveals the key di¤erence in the functioning of the two di¤erent al-
lowance market congurations. Whereas the supply of allowances, L; is xed under a
cap-and-trade regime, the supply of allowances under intensity standards  reected
by the RHS of (27)  varies with aggregate clean output QRc = n
R
c fc:
We now have four conditions for the long run equilibrium: (13) for the total level
L of emissions, (26) for each sector i; and (27): However, we have ve variables:
c; d; nc; nd and w: This implies that the solution is not uniquely determined in
the long run equilibrium. In order to reduce the number of variables to four, let us
dene:
hi  w(i   i) (28)
as the revenue per unit of output that a rm in sector i receives from selling allowances.
In equilibrium, if hc is positive, hd must be negative and vice versa, as is clear from
(27). Substituting (28) into (26) and (27) respectively yields:
nifi = i + hi i = c; d; (29)
ncfchc =  ndfdhd: (30)
We now have a system of four equations: (29) for each sector i = c; d; (30) and (13).
This system can then be solved for the four unknown variables: nc; nd; hc and hd:
Thus, while the allowance price w as well as the sector-specic standards c and d
are not uniquely determined in equilibrium, the amount that each rm receives from
selling (or spends on buying) allowances per unit of output is determined.
We shall see that this system of four equations has two solutions, which can be
compared on welfare. Since both solutions have the same level of emissions (L) in
the long run equilibrium, they feature the same level of environmental damage. This
12
implies that we can abstract from the environmental damage component in the welfare
function explicitly.
Under both emissions trading schemes, output per rm is given by (7). From (2),
(7) and (13), welfare for a given level L of total emissions, with qi = fi in both sectors
is given by:
W =
X
i=c;d

inifi   1
2
(nifi)
2   cinifi   niFi

  
 X
i=c;d
inifi   L
!
: (31)
The rst two terms between square brackets on the RHS denote the consumption utility
from the good (the area below the inverse demand curve); the third term denotes
aggregate variable cost, and the fourth term aggregate xed cost. The second term
on the RHS of (31) is the emissions constraint (13) with qi = fi (i = c; d). The only
di¤erence between the two solutions consists of the number ni of rms in either sector,
since output per rm is xed.
We can now state:
Proposition 2 The long run equilibrium with emissions trading based on a pollution
intensity standard is given by equations (13), (29) for each sector i = c; d; and (30).
This system can be solved for nc; nd; hc and hd; with ni denoting the number of rms
in sector i and hi the revenue per unit of output that a rm in sector i receives from
selling allowances.
1. There are two solutions: r and . Solution r features nrc > nc; n
r
d < nd (with the
number ni of rms in sector i in the unconstrained equilibrium given by (8)), and
clean rms selling allowances to dirty rms. Solution  features nc < nc; n

d > nd;
and dirty rms selling allowances to clean rms.
2. Solution r leads to higher welfare than solution .
3. Solution r exists if and only if both inequalities (14) and (15) hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2: Long run equilibrium with intensity standards
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2 for our numerical example (21). Analogous to
pAc (Qd) in Figure 1, p
r
c(Qd) gives the equilibrium clean output price for a given equi-
librium level of Qd in solution r and p

d(Qd) does the same for solution ; with the
exogenous level L of emissions given by (22):10
In solution r; clean rms sell allowances to dirty rms. For instance, when Qd =
120; Figure 2 shows that prc = 60 so that Q
r
c = 240; implying that this is solution r for
the exogenous emission level L = 480: Figure 2 illustrates equation (30) for solution r:
The amount Qchc that clean rms receive from selling allowances equals the amount
 Qdhd that dirty rms pay for allowances. In Figure 2, Qrchrc is given by the area
Zmrrrjr = 240  40 = 9600; while  Qrdhrd is given by ZJrT rM r = 120  80 = 9600:
The full solution r for L = 480 is thus: Qrd = 120; p
r
d = 180; n
r
d = 15; h
r
d =  80 and
Qrc = 240; p
r
c = 60; n
r
c = 30; h
r
c = 40:
In solution ; dirty rms sell allowances to clean rms. For instance, when Qd =
10The expressions for prc(Qd) and p

c(Qd) are derived in Appendix A.4.
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224; Figure 2 shows that pc = 268 so that Q

c = 32 which implies that this is solution 
for the exogenous emission level L = 480: Figure 2 illustrates equation (30) for solution
: The amount Qdhd that dirty rms receive from selling allowances equals the amount
 Qchc that clean rms pay for allowances. In Figure 2, Qdhd is given by the area
ZMT J = 224  24 = 5376; while  Qchc is given by Zjtm = 32  168 = 5376:
The full solution  for L = 480 is thus: Qd = 224; p

d = 76; n

d = 28; h

d = 24 and
Qc = 32; p

c = 268; n

c = 4; h

c = 168:
Next, let us compare welfare in both solutions r and  for the numerical example
(21) with L = 480: In Figure 2, welfare in sector i with output Qi is given by the area
between the demand curve pi(Qi) and the long run average cost curve c+f . In solution
r; welfare in the clean and dirty sector together is, respectively:
W r = (ZGB  Bmrtr) + (ZGB  BM rT r)
=
(2002   402) + (2002   802)
2
= 36000:
This exceeds welfare in solution ; which can be calculated in the same way as:
W  = (ZGB  Bmt) + (ZGB  BMT )
=
(2002   1682) + (2002   242)
2
= 25600:
The intuition is as follows. Emissions trading via intensity standards inevitably leads
to the subsidization and expansion of one sector (relative to the unconstrained bench-
mark), and the taxation and contraction of the other sector. It is better for the clean
sector to expand, because this leads to a relatively small increase in emissions so that
the dirty sector does not have to contract a lot in order to reach the desired emission
level. By contrast, expansion of the dirty sector leads to a large emission increase, so
that the clean sector has to contract signicantly.
Since solution r yields higher welfare than solution ; we shall assume from now
on that the regulator will implement solution r where clean rms sell allowances to
dirty rms. Thus, nRi = n
r
i and h
R
i = h
r
i ; with n
r
i and h
r
i (i = c; d) given by equations
(A1a) through (A1d) in Appendix A.1. Solution r can be implemented with a range
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of sector-specic intensity standard combinations (c; d). It follows from (28) that:
hrc
 hrd
=
c   c
d   d :
In the above example with c = 1 and  = 2, where L = 480 implies hrc = 40 and
hrd =  80; this becomes:
1
2
=
c   1
2  d :
Thus we have c 2 (1; 2] and d 2 [0; 2): Note that the range of solutions includes the
uniform standard c = d = 43 : By (28), the allowance price w decreases as c and
d move further away from c and d respectively, ultimately dropping to w = 40 for
(c; d) = (2; 0):
4 Welfare comparison
In this section we compare welfare under the two emission trading policies. Since we
are comparing cap-and-trade and intensity-based emissions trading for a given equal
level of emissions, we can abstract from the environmental damage component in the
welfare function explicitly. Welfare for a given level L of total emissions, with long
run output per rm qi = fi in both sectors, is given by (31) as explained in subsection
3.2.11 We nd that:
Proposition 3 Emissions trading via an absolute cap-and-trade scheme maximizes
welfare for a given level of total emissions under the constraint that qi = fi (i = c; d):
Emissions trading via intensity standards results in too many clean rms and too few
dirty rms.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimality of cap-and-trade given that qi = fi: We know
from section 3.1 that the long run cap-and-trade equilibrium for our numerical example
(21) with L = 400 is Qd = 120 and Qc = 160: In Figure 1, welfare in sector i with
output Qi is given by the area between the demand curve pi(Qi) and the long run
11Without the zero-prot result that qi = fi (or any other constraints on qi), the welfare optimum
would feature nc and nd arbitrarily small (ignoring the integer constraint) or nc = nd = 1 (taking the
integer constraint into account) in order to minimize aggregate xed costs.
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average cost curve c+ f . The sum of welfare in the dirty and clean sector respectively
is then:
WA = (ZGB  MdTdB) + (ZGB  McTcB)
=
(2002   802) + (2002   402)
2
= 36000:
How would welfare change if we slightly decreased production of the dirty good and
increased production of the clean good, so that total emissions remain at 400. Since
d = 2c; we can increase clean output by twice the dirty output reduction. A marginal
reduction in dirty output reduces welfare in Figure 1 byMdTd = 80: A double marginal
increase in the production of the clean good raises welfare by 2McTc = 80: Total welfare
thus remains unchanged, which means that the long run cap-and-trade equilibrium
must be the welfare optimum.
Emissions trading on the basis of intensity standards cannot implement the welfare
optimum. As we know from subsection 3.2, the clean sector is subsidized and the
dirty sector is taxed under such a system. Thus clean output is higher than in the
unconstrained benchmark, and dirty output is lower. It is easily seen with the aid of
Figure 1 that the optimal response to emission reduction is output reduction in both
sectors.12 This leads to higher welfare than output reduction in one sector only, which
in turn is better than output reduction in one sector and output expansion in the other
sector. Under a regime of intensity standards the dirty sector is ine¢ ciently small to
compensate for the growth in the clean sector.
5 Conclusions
The design of markets for tradeable emission allowances can generally take two forms:
organizing trade on the basis of an absolute cap or on the basis of relative pollution
intensity standards. The design has implications for the functioning of these markets,
particularly in relation to their interaction with output markets and the impact on
entry and exit. This paper analyzes these interactions and assesses the corresponding
long run welfare performance of these emissions trading schemes in a two-sector (clean
12See Holland et al. (2009) for a similar assessment of Low Carbon Fuel Standards.
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and dirty) model with imperfectly competitive output markets, where we dene the
clean sector as the sector with the highest valueper unit of emissions.
With intensity standards we allow the maximum allowed level of emissions per unit
of output to di¤er between the two sectors. This means that the standard does not
depend on the denition of a unit of output. We nd that intensity standards could
result in clean rms selling allowances to dirty rms, or in dirty rms selling to clean
rms. Since the former outcome always yields higher welfare, we assumed that the
regulator will set the standards so as to implement this outcome.
With free entry and exit driving prots to zero, output per rm in either of the two
sectors does not depend on how emissions trading is organized but only depends on the
xed cost of producing in a sector. This is because a rm faces constant full marginal
cost, comprising both the production and pollution cost. It is shown that an absolute
cap-and-trade regime always generates the rst-best outcome in the long run, given
the zero-prot output level per rm with free entry and exit in the output market.
Emissions trading on the basis of relative intensity standards leads to too many clean
rms in the long run equilibrium, i.e., the size of the clean sector is too large compared
to the size of the clean sector under cap-and-trade.
A Appendix
A.1 Normalization of the Slope of a Demand Function
The slope of the demand function for a good, when using conventional units for mea-
suring the good as well as for money, is usually di¤erent from  1. In this appendix we
show how to normalize the slopes of the demand functions for two goods (gasoline and
coal) to  1 by changing the unit of measurement of the respective goods. We leave
the money measurement intact, so that consumer surplus from the two goods can still
be added together after normalization.
Suppose the inverse demand function for gasoline (gas) is:
Pgas = A BYgas
with the quantity of gasoline Ygas measured in gallons and its price Pgas in dollars
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per gallon. Thus the units on A and B are $/gallonand $/(gallon)2respectively.
Total revenue is PgasYgas and units for total revenue are dollars. Now to normalize the
demand function, we rst divide both sides by b  pB 1=b-gallonsper gallon (or
equivalently, we multiply by 1=b gallons per 1=b-gallon). The demand function then
becomes:
pgas = gas   bYgas
with pgas  Pgas=b and gas  A=b: Now pgas and gas are measured in $ per 1=b-
gallonand b = B=b in $=(gallon  1=b-gallon). Finally, we introduce the quantity
measure Qgas which is expressed in 1=b-gallonso that Qgas = bYgas: This turns the
demand function into:
pgas = gas   gasQgas;
with gas = $1=(1=b-gallon)
2. The slope of the demand function is now  1:
As a specic example, let us set A = $500=gallon and B = $100=(gallon)2 in
Pgas = A BYgas. This means the vertical intercept is $500 per gallon and the horizontal
intercept is 5 gallons. Writing the unit of measurement below each parameter and
variable, we have:
Pgas = 500   (100  Ygas)
$
gallon
$
gallon
$
(gallon)2
gallon
Multiplying the left-hand side and the right-hand side by 0.1 gallon/decigallon yields:
(Pgas  0:1) = (500  0:1)   (100  0:1  Ygas)
$
gallon
gallon
decigallon
$
gallon
gallon
decigallon
$
(gallon)2
gallon
decigallon
gallon
Simplifying and noting that Ygas = 0:1Qgas yields:
pgas = 50   (100  0:1  0:1  Qgas)
$
decigallon
$
decigallon
$
(gallon)2
gallon
decigallon
gallon
decigallon
decigallon
Simplifying this gives:
pgas = 50   (1  Qgas)
$
decigallon
$
decigallon
$
(decigallon)2
decigallon
After normalization, the vertical intercept is $50 per decigallon and the horizontal
intercept is 50 decigallons.
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In the same way, let the inverse demand function for coal be Pcoal = C DYcoal with
the quantity of coal measured in tons and its price in dollars per ton. We normalize this
demand function to pcoal = coal  Qcoal with pcoal  Pcoal=d; coal  C=d and Qcoal 
dYk where d 
p
D: Now the quantity of coal is measured in 1=d-tons and its
price in dollars per 1=d-ton. As a specic example, let us set C = $100 per ton and
D = $4=(ton)2. This means the vertical intercept is $100 per ton and the horizontal
intercept is 25 tons. We normalize this demand function by expressing the quantity
of coal Qcoal in half tons,with its price pcoal expressed in dollar per half ton. After
normalization the demand curve is pcoal = 50 Qcoal. The vertical intercept is $50 per
half ton and the horizontal intercept is 50 half tons.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2.1 There are two solutions to equations (29) for each sector i = c; d; (13)
and (30) which we shall denote by r and : Solution r is:
hrc =
 d (cd   dc)  2c( E   L) + d
q
(cd   dc)2 + 4L
 
E   L
2 (2c + 
2
d)
(A1a)
hrd =
c (cd   dc)  2d( E   L)  c
q
(cd   dc)2 + 4L
 
E   L
2 (2c + 
2
d)
(A1b)
nrc =
2Lc + d

cd   dc +
q
(cd   dc)2 + 4L
 
E   L
2fc (2c + 
2
d)
(A1c)
nrd =
2Ld + c

dc   cd  
q
(cd   dc)2 + 4L
 
E   L
2fd (2c + 
2
d)
; (A1d)
with E > L being the unconstrained emissions given by (11) and i by (9). We see
that hrd in (A1b) is negative, i.e., dirty rms are buying allowances so that n
r
d < nd by
(10) and (29). Market clearing with nrc; n
r
d > 0 then requires by (30) that h
r
c > 0: clean
rms are selling allowances, and nrc > nc by (10) and (29).
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Solution  is:
hc =
 d (cd   dc)  2c
 
E   L  dq(cd   dc)2 + 4L( E   L)
2 (2c + 
2
d)
(A2a)
hd =
c (cd   dc)  2d
 
E   L+ cq(cd   dc)2 + 4L( E   L)
2 (2c + 
2
d)
(A2b)
nc =
2Lc + d

cd   dc  
q
(cd   dc)2 + 4L
 
E   L
2fc (2c + 
2
d)
(A2c)
nd =
2Ld + c

dc   cd +
q
(cd   dc)2 + 4L
 
E   L
2fd (2c + 
2
d)
: (A2d)
We see that hc in (A2a) is negative, i.e., clean rms are buying allowances so that
nc < nc by (10) and (29). Market clearing with nc; nd > 0 then requires by (30) that
hd > 0: dirty rms are selling allowances so that n

d > nd by (10) and (29). 
Proposition 2.2 Substituting (29) and (30) into (31) gives welfare WR under intensity
standards:
WR =
P
i (nifi)
2
2
: (A3)
Substituting (A1c) and (A1d) into (A3) yields:
W r =
(cd   dc)2 + 2L
 
2L  E+ (cd   dc)q(cd   dc)2 + 4L   E   L
2 (2c + 
2
d)
:
Substituting (A2c) and (A2d) into (A3) yields:
W  =
(cd   dc)2 + 2L
 
2L  E  (cd   dc)q(cd   dc)2 + 4L   E   L
2 (2c + 
2
d)
:
By denition (12), W r > W : 
Proposition 2.3 Since nrd < nd and n
r
c > nc; we have to ensure that n
r
d > 0 and
Pc(Q
r
c) > 0: From (A1d), n
r
d > 0 if and only if (14) holds. Maximizing n
r
c in (A1c) with
respect to L yields:
L =
E + c
p
2c + 
2
d
2
: (A4)
Substituting (A4) into (A1c) yields, using Proposition 1:
Qmaxc = n
max
c fc =
c +
p
2c + 
2
d
2
:
Then Pc(Qmaxc ) > 0 if and only if (15) holds. 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Maximizing welfare (31) with respect to ni (i = c; d) yields:
(i   ci   fi)fi   nif 2i   ifi = 0: (A5)
This is the same condition as the rst-order condition under the cap-and-trade regime,
substituting (7) and (16) into (4). The shadow price  of emissions in (A5) therefore
equals the allowance price v in (17), and ni in (A5) equals nAi in (18). This means
that a cap-and-trade scheme implements the welfare optimum for a given level of total
emissions with qi = fi: Combining (19) and Proposition 2.1, we nd nAc < nc < n
r
c =
nRc : Combining n
A
c < n
R
c with (13) yields n
A
d > n
R
d : 
A.4 Derivation of prc(Qd) and p

c(Qd) curves
Solving (29) and (30) for Qc yields two solutions:
Qc = Q
+
c (Qd) 
c +
p
2c + 4Qd(d  Qd)
2
; (A6)
Qc = Q
 
c (Qd) 
c  
p
2c + 4Qd(d  Qd)
2
: (A7)
The highest possible value of Qd in (A6) and (A7) is where the term under the square
root is zero:13
Qmaxd =
d +
p
2c + 
2
d
2
> d: (A8)
The Q+c solution (A6) includes the unconstrained benchmark, since Q
+
c (d) = c:
Substituting (A6) into (13), we nd that total emissions are:
L+(Qd) = d + c
c
2
+
p
2c + 4Qd(d  Qd)

: (A9)
The rst and second derivatives are:
L+0(Qd) = d   c (2Qd   d)p
2c + 4Qd(d  Qd)
; L+00(Qd) =
 2c (2c + 2d)
(2c + 4Qd(d  Qd))
3
2
< 0:
(A10)
13The other solution Qmind =
d 
p
2c+
2
d
2 < 0 is irrelevant.
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From (A8) and (A10) we nd:
L+0(d) =
dc   cd
c
> 0; lim
Qd!Qmaxd
L+0(Qd) =  1: (A11)
The inequality follows from (12). Equation (A11) together with L+00(Qd) < 0 from
(A10) implies that L+(Qd) has a unique stationary point, which is a maximum, between
d and Q
max
d : Thus L
+0(Qd) > 0 for Qd 2 [0; d]: From (A6) it follows that Q+c (Qd) 
c = ncfc for Qd < d = ndfd: Thus, Q
+
c (Qd) implements solution r for Qd < d:
Substituting (A6) into (2), the expression for prc(Qd) is then:
prc(Qd) = c  
c +
p
2c + 4Qd(d  Qd)
2
for Qd 2 [0; d]:
In our numerical example (21), this becomes:
prc(Qd) = 200 
p
10 000 +Qd(200 Qd) for Qd 2 [0; 200]:
By (A11), L+(Qd) > L+(d) = E for Qd just above d: The other solution to L
+(Qd) =
E is:
Qd = ~Qd  d (dd + cc)
2c + 
2
d
: (A12)
Since L+(Qd) has a unique stationary point, which is a maximum, between d and
Qmaxd ; L
+0(Qd) < 0 for Qd 2 [ ~Qd; Qmaxd ] and L+(Qd) < E for Qd 2 ( ~Qd; Qmaxd ]: With
Qd 2 ( ~Qd; Qmaxd ]; Qd exceeds d and L+(Qd) < E; so that Qc must be below c; which
means this is part of solution :
The other part of solution  is found on Q c (Qd) in (A7) with Q
 
c (Q
max
d ) = c=2 by
(A8); and Qd = 0 and Qd = d the only solutions to Q
 
c (Qd) = 0: Thus Qd 2 [d; Qmaxd ]:
Substituting (A7) into (13), total emissions are:
L (Qd) = d + c
c
2
 
p
2c + 4Qd(d  Qd)

with
L 0(Qd) =
2c(2Qd   d) + d
p
2c   4Q2d + 4dQdp
2c   4Q2d + 4dQd
> 0:
The inequality follows from Qd  d: The correspondence pc(Qd) is therefore given by:
pc(Qd) =
8>><>>:
c   c+
p
2c+4Qd(d Qd)
2
for Qd 2 [ ~Qd; Qmaxd ]
c   c 
p
2c+4Qd(d Qd)
2
for Qd 2 [c2 ; Qmaxd ]
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In our numerical example (21), this becomes:
pc(Qd) =
8<:
200 p10 000 + 200Qd  Q2d for Qd 2 [240; 241:42]
200 +
p
10 000 + 200Qd  Q2d for Qd 2 [200; 241:42]
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